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Abstract 
Research on reciprocals has uncovered a variety of semantic contributions that the 
reciprocal can make, creating problems for proposals that the reciprocal unambiguously 
means something weak (e.g., Langendoen 1978). However, there is no real evidence that 
reciprocals are ambiguous, despite previous claims to the contrary (e.g., Fiengo and Lasnik 
1973). First, we classify the apparently heterogeneous list of meanings proposed in previous 
research into a natural taxonomy, showing how they arise from a small stock of logical 
operations and predicates. Second, we exhibit a partial ordering of the various reciprocal 
meanings according to logical strength, which we make crucial use of in determining what 
reciprocals mean in each specific context where they appear. Third, we hypothesize that 
a reciprocal statement expresses the strongest candidate meaning that is consistent with 
known properties of the relation expressed by the scope of the reciprocal. This hypothesis 
is supported by analysis of a large collection of examples we have gathered from various 
corpora. 
I The reciprocal as a quantifier 
Starting with Dougherty ( 1974) and Fiengo and Lasnik ( 1973), a significant modem 
literature has grown up on the subject of what reciprocals mean. Langendoen ( 1978) 
made a valuable systematization of the discussion and endeavored to draw some 
firm conclusions. Important contributions have been made subsequently by, among 
others, Higginbotham ( 1980), KaDski ( 1987), Roberts ( 1987), �nning ( 1989), 
Moltmann ( 1992), and Schwarzschild ( 1 992). 
As we undertake a new synthesis of the expanded literature on the subject 
and draw our own conclusions, we want to begin by pointing out something that, 
though implicit in the literature we survey, has never been made explicit: 
• Reciprocal expressions such as English each other and one another, Chichewa 
-an, Japanese (o)tagai, etc. ,  are quantifiers. 
We do not mean that reciprocals somehow give rise to two quantifiers - perhaps 
two universal quantifiers, or one universal and one existential quantifier. We mean 
rather that: 
• Reciprocals express a single polyadic quantifier that binds two variables in 
its scope, both variables ranging over one set, the restricted domain of the 
quantification. 
Thus a sentence like 
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( 1 )  Tom, Dick and Harry saw each other 
expresses a proposition that might be symbolized 
(2) RECIP{Tom, Dick, Harry}x, y saw(x, y) 
using the quantifier symbol RECIP, with its restricted domain {Tom, Dick, Harry} su­
perscripted and the two variables it binds x , y suffixed, all preceding the quantifier's 
scope. 
In terms of standard generalized quantifier theory, RECIP is a quantifier of 
type ( 1 ,2); its meaning is a relation between sets A of members of the universe of 
discourse and two-place relations R on the universe of discourse (van Benthem, 
1 989) . A formula 
RECIPAU, V ¢ 
is true iff the relation RECIP holds between the set A and the binary relation of which 
[AU,V.  ¢] is the characteristic function. Like all generalized quantifiers of natural 
languages, RECIP is required to be conservative, in the sense that 
RECIP(A, R) iff RECIP(A, R n (A x A) ) 
holds for all A and R. 
Our purpose will be to propose a definition for RECIP, illustrating our claims 
with sentences taken from corpora we have examined. Section 3 examines previous 
proposals for reciprocal meaning. Most of these proposed meanings can be stated 
in terms of a set of simple relations. This allows for a specification of entailments 
among these meanings, given in Section 4. We will make crucial use of these 
entailments in our definition OfRECIP, presented informally in Section 7 and formally 
in Section 9. We leave for future research other issues such as the interaction ofRECIP 
with other semantic operators and the interpretation of reciprocal expressions with 
quantified antecedents. We also defer discussion of the syntax/semantics interface 
to another paper. 
2 Why there's a problem about what reciprocals mean 
2.1 Different sentences have different truth conditions 
Research on the syntax and semantics of reciprocity often centers on sentences such 
as: 
(3) John and Bill sawlkicked/laughed at each other. 
Examples in which the reciprocal antecedent denotes a group with two members 
- here, John and Bill - are particularly easy to analyze. However, attention is 
often confined to these simple cases. In general, when groups of two members are 
considered, each group member is required to stand in the stated relation to the other 
member. ! 
Generalizing to larger antecedent groups, this suggests that 
(4) Willow School's fifth-graders know each other. 
1 Except for a few cases. Kanski (1987) claims that "Their bunk beds are on top of each other" is 
true when one bunk bed is on top and the other one is under it. 
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should mean that each Willow fifth-grader knows every other one. In this case, we 
get the correct truth conditions, as evidenced by the self-contradictoriness of 
(5) # Willow School's fifth-graders know each other, but the oldest one doesn't 
know the youngest. 2 
However, when reciprocal statements with antecedent groups of larger than two 
members are considered extensively, these truth conditions turn out to be the wrong 
ones for many cases. For instance, the following statement from The New York 
TImes can be true despite the impossibility of each group member sitting alongside 
every other one: 
(6) As the preposterous horde crowded around, waiting for the likes of Evans 
and Mike Greenwell, five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other: Larry 
Andersen, Jeff Reardon, Jeff Gray, Dennis Lamp and Tom Bolton. 
In contrast to (5), note the consistency of 
(7) Five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other; Larry Andersen and Tom Bolton 
sat on the ends, separated by Jeff Reardon, Jeff Gray and Dennis Lamp. 
Such examples show that the reciprocal does not always place the same semantic 
requirements on the interpretation of the sentences containing it. Another example 
is: 
(8) Mrs. Smith's third-grade students gave each other measles. 
Clearly, it is impossible for each member of the third-grade class to give measles to 
every other member. Since measles is a disease that can't be contracted twice, no 
one can give measles back to whoever gave it to them. Nevertheless, sentence (8) 
could perfectly well be true. 
In addition to these clearcut examples of the reciprocal not imposing the 
strong requirements that it does in sentences (3) and (4), the literature contains other 
examples intended to show that the strong interpretation is not the reciprocal's only 
meaning. Some of these examples are considerably less clearcut than sentences (7) 
and (8), however, because the reciprocal can be vague. Its vagueness sometimes 
hampers attempts to provide an accurate characterization of what it means. 
2Further, note the felicity of the following example: 
(i) Willow School's fifth-graders know each other, except the oldest one doesn't know the youngest 
one. 
In general, the exception construction is felicitous only in the presence of universal or negative 
universal quantification over appropriate n-tuples. (See Moltmann 1993, although she suggests that 
universal quantification over pairs may be only implied, not asserted, by reciprocal sentences like 
(4).) Witness the following contrast: 
(ii) Every fifth-grader knows every other fifth-grader, except the oldest one doesn't  know the 
youngest. 
(iii) # Every fifth-grader knows some other fifth-grader, except the oldest one doesn't  know the 
youngest. 
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2.2 Truth conditions may be vague or imprecise 
The problems posed by vagueness can be illustrated from many perspectives. For 
one, consider a bar-room brawl. The statement 
(9) The men were hitting each other 
may be a perfectly acceptable description of this situation even if some men in the 
bar do not hit some other ones, as most likely would be the case. Does this constitute 
a counterexample to the claim that (9) expresses the same sort of truth conditions as 
(4)? Maybe, but maybe not; it doesn't seem to be a crisp counterexample like (6). 
The reason is that even the strongest interpretation of the reciprocal may be vague 
to a certain extent. 
Notice that the degree of vagueness decreases when the antecedent denotes 
a relatively small group, as in 
( 10) The four men were hitting each other. 
This sentence clearly claims that each pair is involved. Similarly, the reciprocal is 
less vague when its antecedent group is referred to by listing the members. 
( 1 1 )  John, Paul, George, Ringo and Stu were hitting each other 
These observations are evidence that sentence (9) is in fact vague, raising the very 
real possibility that sentence (9) is true of bar-room brawls in which near enough to 
all pairs of men stand in the relation of hitting, and that no sharp boundary divides 
what's near enough to all from what isn't. 
Although vagueness degrades the theory-testing value of some reciprocal 
examples, there are still plenty of clear cases like (7) and (8), where any vagueness 
infecting the truth conditions does not obscure clear differences with the truth 
conditions of certain other reciprocal sentences. An empirically adequate theory of 
reciprocal meaning therefore will have to assign different truth conditions depending 
on a number of factors, including context-dependence. 
2.3 Truth conditions may depend on extra-linguistic context 
Sometimes the context of a reciprocal statement determines a subset comprising 
just some pairs of distinct members of the antecedent group, what Schwarzschild 
( 1992) calls the operative ones, as the only pairs relevant to the truth or falsity of 
the reciprocal. Schwarzschild provides the following example: 
( 1 2) The prisoners on the two sides of the room could see each other. 
He points out that this sentence would be false of a situation in which there are 
two groups of prisoners, each on one side of a room, and there is an opaque barrier 
between them; the fact that the prisoners on side A can see other prisoners on side A 
(and similarly for side B) is not sufficient to make the example true. The operative 
pairs in this context couple prisoners of side A with ones on side B. 
A different sort of context-dependency is that the quantity of operative pairs 
which the reciprocal says stand in the relation may be determined by context. For 
example, 
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( 1 3) The inspector found peach fruit flies at four different locations within a mile 
of each other. 
would mean that each of the locations is within a mile of every other location, in a 
context where it was clear that the inspector was systematically criss-crossing the 
area he was searching. But in a context where it was clear that the inspector was 
making a linear sweep through a large area to collect a sample of fruit fly traps, the 
statement would mean that no two consecutive finds of fruit flies were more than 
a mile apart. Roberts ( 1987) presents an analysis of reciprocals which reflects the 
contextual determination of quantificational force; we briefly discuss it below. 
Summing up, there are three reasons why what reciprocals mean is prob­
lematic : 
• The reciprocal (like some type ( 1 , 1 )  quantifiers such as many, few and most) 
exhibits a certain amount of vagueness. 
• Nevertheless, there are genuine shifts in the truth conditions of reciprocal 
sentences .  
• What features of context trigger these shifts and according to what general 
principles has not been systematically investigated. 
Our aim will be to provide an analysis of these shifts, reliably predicting the inter­
pretation of a sentence containing a reciprocal in a given context. We turn now to a 
discussion of previous proposals for the semantics of reciprocity. 
3 Previously proposed definitions of reciprocity 
Langendoen ( 1 978) was the first to provide an extensive taxonomy of reciprocal 
meanings. In his pioneering article, he discussed and compared six relations as 
candidates for the meaning of the reciprocal. We are aware of two other proposals 
for reciprocal meanings which Langendoen did not discuss; these two come from 
the work of Kaliski ( 1987). Of the eight proposals of Langendoen and Kaliski, 
which we enumerate formally and discuss in the subsections of this section, we 
think that three are genuine meanings of the reciprocal, but the other five are not 
really things that the reciprocal can mean. 
3.1 Attested definitions 
The examples given as evidence for these reciprocal meanings are false if the 
definition is not satisfied. 
Strong Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978, also called each-the other by Fiengo and 
Lasnik 1973) is defined as: 
(SR) IA I  ;:: 2 and \;fx, y E A (x =f. y -> Rxy) 
Informally, SR says that every member of A is related directly by R to every other 
member. 
Examples (4) and (5) attest that the English reciprocal each other can mean 
Strong Reciprocity. 
( 14) (= 4) Willow School's fifth-graders know each other 
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is false unless each member of the set A of Willow fifth-graders stands in the relation 
R of knowing to every other member of A; and ( 14) is true in that case. 
Intermediate Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978) is defined as: 
(IR) IA I :::: 2 and 
\:Ix, y E A (x =1= y -t 
for some sequence Zo , . . .  , Zm E A (x = Zo1\ RZOZI 1\ . . . 1\ RZm- 1 Zm I\ zm = y) 
Informally, IR says that every member of A is  related directly or indirectly to 
every other member via the relation R. Unlike Strong Reciprocity and most other 
definitions offered in the literature, Intermediate Reciprocity can hold even when 
the relation R is asymmetric. 
Although Langendoen does not give an example of Intermediate Reciprocity, 
we believe that ( 1 5) is one: 
( 15) The telephone poles are spaced five hundred feet from each other. 
This sentence is true of a situation in which every pole is five hundred feet from the 
nearest one or ones along the telephone line in either direction. Sentence ( 1 5) can 
easily be true even if not every pole is spaced five hundred feet from every other one 
(Strong Reciprocity need not hold). But the sentence is false if any two adjacent 
poles are separated by a distance other than five hundred feet. 
The following additional examples of the reciprocal being interpreted as 
Intermediate Reciprocity are taken from The New York Times. 
( 16) (= 6) As the preposterous horde crowded around, waiting for the likes of 
Evans and Mike Greenwell, five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other: 
Larry Andersen, Jeff Reardon, Jeff Gray, Dennis Lamp and Tom Bolton. 
( 17) "Technically there is enough energy along our coasts to power Britain," he 
said, "but at this point to deliver 1 ,000 megawatts to the consumer, you need a 
wave power plant with machines spread out along 30 miles at some distance 
from each other, much like underwater fenceposts." 
Inclusive Alternative Ordering (Kanski 1987) is defined as: 
(lAO) \:Ix E A 3y E A (x =1= y 1\ (Rxy V Ryx)) 
Informally, lAO says that every member x of the set A participates with some other 
member in the relation R as the first or as the second argument, but not necessarily 
in both roles. Inclusive Alternative Ordering is the weakest relation that has been 
proposed as a meaning for the reciprocal. KaDski presents the following sentence 
as an example of Inclusive Alternative Ordering: 
( 1 8) The monks lash one another. 
He claims that this sentence is true in a situation in which there are ten monks and 
the lashers are disjoint from the lashees. 
A possibly more convincing example is 
( 19) (= 8) Mrs. Smith's third-grade students gave each other measles. 
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This sentence would be true if each member of the class either gave measles to one 
or more other class members or got measles from another member of the class. It 
would be false if some class member neither gave measles to any other member of 
the class nor got the disease from a fellow class member (thus, got it from outside 
the class if at all) .  These are exactly the truth conditions of lAO. 
3.2 Unattested definitions 
The purported examples for these definitions are problematic for various reasons . 
Partitioned Strong Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978, also called the reciprocal 
relation by Fiengo and Lasnik 1973 and the distinct subsets relation by Dougherty 
1974) is defined as: 
(PSR) There is a partition AI , ' . .  , An of A such that for all i, IAi l � 2 and 
\fx, y E Ai (x #- y --+ Rxy) 
This is simply Strong Reciprocity holding of disjoint subsets that cover the whole 
set A. 
Fiengo and Lasnik claim that Partitioned Strong Reciprocity correctly rep­
resents the truth conditions of: 
(20) The men are hitting each other. 
We disagree. We think this sentence means Strong Reciprocity but exhibits a 
certain amount of vagueness. Fiengo and Lasnik acknowledge (pp. 452-3) "the 
impossibility of discrete partitioning in an unclear situation" such as a general 
brawl, and speculate on why reciprocals are somewhat vague. The one piece 
of evidence they offer for PSR as the correct meaning for example (20) is their 
intuition that it is false of a situation in which three men are hitting a fourth one, 
who is hitting them, and no other hitting is going on. We share this intuition, but 
note it is fully compatible with Strong Reciprocity, since the set of four men is so 
small that vagueness leaves no latitude for counting this as enough hitting to make 
the reciprocal true. 
In fact, we believe that all examples that appear to illustrate Partitioned 
Strong Reciprocity instead involve Strong Reciprocity, some of them involving 
distribution to contextually-given sets as discussed by Schwarzschild ( 1992). On 
this view, Partitioned Strong Reciprocity might better be termed Distributed Strong 
Reciprocity. Consider the following example from The New York Times: 
(2 1 )  That heart debt is to the small-town society of her youth, which Bloodworth­
Thomason describes as a "kind of microcosm of eccentric characters and 
Southern humor and farnilial love and extended family and everybody knows 
everybody and their grandparents knew each other." 
This sentence describes a situation in which each citizen of a town satisfies two 
conditions: that his maternal grandparents knew his paternal grandparents, and vice 
versa. We can also imagine an example requiring distribution in a different way: 
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(22) Many years ago, arranged marriages were common in that town. As for 
the Smiths, their great-grandparents were complete strangers to each other 
when they got married. But that all changed 60 years ago; of course, their 
grandparents knew each other before they got married. 
Here, the context requires a different interpretation: Mr. Smith's maternal grand­
parents knew each other, and so did his paternal grandparents; likewise for Mrs. 
Smith's grandparents. In this context, example (22) would be judged false if either 
grandparents of either Smith had an arranged marriage, even if it happened that (for 
example) the maternal grandmother knew the paternal grandfather, and the paternal 
grandmother knew the maternal grandfather. It is not sufficient that some partition 
or other satisfy SR. To make the sentence true, only the contextually salient partition 
will suffice. 
Partitioned Intermediate Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978) is defined as: 
(PIR) There is a partition AI , . . .  , An of A such that for all i, I Ai I � 2 and 
'Vx, y E Ai (x =f:. Y -+ 
for some sequence zo , . . .  , Zm E Ai (x = Zo /\ RZOZI /\ . . . /\ RZm-l  zm /\ zm = y) )  
Partitioned Intermediate Reciprocity bears the same relation t o  Intermediate Reci­
procity that Partitioned Strong Reciprocity bears to Strong Reciprocity: Partitioned 
Intermediate Reciprocity requires Intermediate Reciprocity to hold within disjoint 
subsets covering A. 
We have found no example that illustrates Partitioned Intermediate Reci­
procity. 
Symmetric Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978, also called the unrestricted subsets 
relation by Dougherty 1974 and Conjunctive Ordering by Katlski 1987) is defined 
as: 
(SmR) 'Vx E A 3y E A (x =f:. Y /\ Rxy /\ Ryx) 
Informally, this says that every member of A has a 'partner' with whom the relation 
R holds in both directions. Dougherty ( 1974) argues that Symmetric Reciprocity 
gives the proper truth conditions for example (23) .  
(23) John, Bill, Tom, Jane, and Mary had relations with each other. 
He claims ( 1974, page 14) that this sentence can be true even if "only heterosexual 
relations are involved" - if (for example) Jane had relations with both John and 
Bill, but John and Bill did not have relations with each other. In this situation, there 
is no way to partition the set {John, Bill, Tom, Jane, Mary} into subsets within 
which each member bears the have relations with relation to every other member. 
We agree that the truth conditions for example (23) are as Dougherty de­
scribes; however, this and all other apparent examples of Symmetric Reciprocity that 
we have found involve relations that are inherently symmetric. Sentence (23) may 
well just attest the possibility of interpreting the reciprocal as Inclusive Alternative 
Ordering. 
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Weak Reciprocity (Langendoen 1978) is defined as : 
(WR) Vx E A 3y , z E A (x =I- y 1\ x =I- z 1\ Rxy 1\ Rzx) 
Informally, WR says that every member of the group A participates in the relation 
R both as the first and as the second argument. Weak Reciprocity is the weakest 
of the relations discussed by Langendoen, but is stronger than Kanski 's Inclusive 
Alternative Ordering. 
Langendoen ( 1978, page 1 83) offers the following example for Weak Reci­
procity (in lieu of Partitioned Intermediate Reciprocity): 
(24) They are at least as heavy as one another. 
We are instructed to evaluate this sentence in a situation in which they refers to a 
group "consisting of five individuals, of whom two weigh 50 kg each, one weighs 
60 kg, and two weigh 70 kg each." Langendoen judges the sentence to be true in 
this situation, and thus to exhibit the truth conditions that Weak Reciprocity would 
assign, although he states (and we agree) that the sentence is "bizarre independent 
of the truth or falsity of the assertion that it makes". Unfortunately, it is not 
easy to come up with more natural sentences that would readily distinguish Weak 
Reciprocity from independently attested definitions. 
In fact, all examples in the literature we are aware of which have been 
prof erred as attesting Weak Reciprocity have as their scope an inherently symmetric 
relation. When the scope relation R is symmetric, Inclusive Alternative Ordering 
implies Weak Reciprocity, Partitioned Intermediate Reciprocity and Symmetric 
Reciprocity as we shall see. Thus, we believe that these examples are best regarded 
as exemplifying lAO and not WR, PIR or SmR, since lAO is also exemplified by 
nonsymmetric cases whose meaning is definitely none of the other definitions. 
Exclusive Alternative Ordering (KaDski 1987) is defined as: 
(EAO) Vx E A 3y E A (x =I- y 1\ (Rxy V Ryx) 1\ ..., (Rxy 1\ Ryx) )  
Informally, EAO says that every member of the group A stands asymmetrically in 
the relation R with some other member. This is a rather peculiar requirement. 
KaDski claims that Exclusive Alternative Ordering is exemplified by asym­
metric relations R, such as: 
(25) The students followed each other (into the room). 
However, we do not believe that the reciprocal ever implies that the relation R does 
not hold symmetrically. Of course, we agree with KaDski that sentences containing 
reciprocals can be true even in case the relation R is asymmetric, as in the case 
of example (25) .  As an account of the truth conditions of such sentences, lAO is 
equivalent to EAO. 
The relationships among these various definitions of reciprocity can be 
seen more clearly if they are unifonnly stated in terms of more basic relations; 
additionally, this enables the statement of implications among these definitions. 
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4 Logical analysis of all previously proposed readings 
Parameterizing the differences between the various definitions of RECIP identified 
by Langendoen and others, as suggested by Dag Westerstahl (p.c.), is useful in un­
derstanding the logical relations among these definitions. We analyze RECIP(A, R) 
as Q(A, RU ) .  Q is either FUL\I or TOT\!: 
FUL(A, R) � R r A = A x A 
TOT(A, R) � dom(R r A) = A 
FUL\I(A, R) � FUL(A, R U J) 
TOT\I(A, R) � TOT(A, R \ J) 
J is the identity relation. The definitions of FUL \I and TOT\I capture the fact 
that truth conditions for the reciprocal never depend on an individual bearing or not 
bearing the relation R to itself. 
RU is either R r A ( = R n (A x A») or the result of applying to it one or 
more of three operations, in any order. The three operations that can be used to get 
RU from R are " ,  v ,  and + :  
R" � R n  R-1 
RV � R U R-1 
R+ � transitive closure of R 
Four of Langendoen's six definitions and one of Ka6.ski's two new ones are express­
ible in these tenns. Below, for R, read R r A: 
Strong Reciprocity: 
Symmetric Reciprocity: 
FUL\I(A, R) 
TOT\I(A, RI\) 
Intennediate Reciprocity: FUL \I (A, R+) 
Partitioned Intennediate Reciprocity: TOT\ J (A, (R+)" )  
Inclusive Alternative Ordering: 
Partitioned Strong Reciprocity and Ka6.ski's Exclusive Alternative Ordering are not 
definable in these terms. Weak: Reciprocity is not definable in these terms, either, 
but can be expressed as the following, using conjunction and the relational converse: 
Weak: Reciprocity: TOT\I(A, R) 1\ TOT\I(A, R-1 )  
The three operations 1\ ,  v ,  and + generate eight different relations from R ,  an d  they 
stand in the inclusion relation in the following way (-+ means �): 
R" 
� 
(R")+ R 
(�  
R+ RV 
----------
(R+)V 
t 
(RV)+ 
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The given format of defining RECIP gives rise to 10 non-equivalent possible def­
initions, of which five are new possibilities that have not been considered in the 
literature. The following graph depicts the implications among these definitions, 
and includes Partitioned Strong Reciprocity, which is not definable in these terms, 
as well as Weak Reciprocity: 
SR: FUL\I(A, R) 
PIR: TOT\I(A, (R+)"' )  
� 
WR: TOT\I(A, R) 1\ TOT\I(A, R-l )  
� 
[5] : TOT\I(A, R) 
lAO: TOT\I(A, RV) 
The RECIP relations labeled [ 1 ]-[5] are possible candidates for the meaning ofRECIP 
that have not been previously discussed in the literature. 
S Attested new definitions of reciprocity 
It appears that some of these new definitions are attested by actual uses of reciprocals. 
In 1.M. Barrie's "Peter Pan," for instance, the sentence 
(26) "The captain !" said the pirates, staring at each other in surprise. 
states that each pirate stared at another one, although perhaps not every pirate was 
stared at by another one. These truth conditions are exactly those of the new 
definition [5] .  
In The New York Times, we find the following description of the National 
Cathedral in Washington, DC: 
(27) Instead, countless stones - each weighing an average of 300 pounds - are 
arranged on top of each other and are held in place by their own mass and the 
force of flying buttresses against the walls. 
Definition [4] would make this sentence an accurate description of the cathedral, 
which is built of stones arranged in staggered, overlapping patterns like a brick 
wall. If [4] is what (27) means, the sentence asserts that the stones form a single 
connected structure; it would be false if, for example, the stones were arranged 
in a multiplicity of piles, each pile separate from the others. More evidence is 
needed before a secure conclusion can be reached, but we believe at least some of 
these systematically-generated new definitions for the reciprocal's meaning are also 
attested. 
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Because there apparently are reciprocals sentences whose meaning is a 
previously unattested definition - most particularly IR, but also [4] and [5] - we 
provisionally assume that other candidates among the ones we have canvassed may 
tum out also to be possible meanings of reciprocals, We do henceforth dismiss 
PSR and EAO, however, as not merely unattested but unallowed meanings for the 
reciprocal,3 The problematic status of the evidence for some reciprocal meanings, 
discussed in Section 3, comes in some instances from the fact that the nature of the 
scope relation R can render some of these meanings indistinguishable, 
6 Dependence of partial ordering on special properties of scope 
Under certain circumstances, some of the definitions discussed in the previous 
section become equivalent; some of these cases were alluded to in Section 3, in 
the discussion of previously proposed but unattested reciprocal meanings, In case 
the scope relation R is transitive and symmetric, for example, the eleven possible 
reciprocal meanings collapse to only two separate cases. Care must be taken 
to control for these factors in considering evidence for the potential reciprocal 
meanings under discussion. 
Symmetric R If R is symmetric, R = R-1 = R/\ = RV and the partially ordered 
possibilities reduce to: 
(28) SR, [2] 
+ 
IR, [ 1 ] , [3] ,  [4] 
+ 
IAO, SmR, PIR, WR, [5] 
Transitive R If R is transitive, R = R+ and the partially ordered possibilities 
reduce to: 
(29) SR, [ 1 ] ,  IR 
----------. 
SmR, PIR [2] ,  [3] 
+ + 
WR [4] 
[� 
IAO 
Transitive and symmetric R If R is transitive and symmetric, the partially ordered 
possibilities reduce to: 
(30) SR, IR, [ 1 ], [2] , [3], [4] 
+ 
IAO, SmR, PIR, WR, [5] 
Asymmetric R If R is asymmetric, R/\ = 0 and SR, [ 1 ] ,  and SmR are necessarily 
false (assuming IA I  2: 2). 
3We emphatically reaffirm, however, that reciprocal VPs can be distributed over the denotation 
of their subject NPs, as other VPs can. This is how examples (21 )  and (22) are interpreted. 
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7 The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis 
We spoke informally in preceding sections of the reciprocal 's meaning, reading, 
interpretation or truth conditions varying with context. To be slightly more precise, 
we were saying that because of what it means, the reciprocal can give different truth 
conditions to different statements. It is time to get more precise still. We have come 
to the main point of this paper: systematic investigation of the factors underlying 
the shifts in reciprocals'  truth conditions which were noted in the literature we cite. 
On one important issue - whether the reciprocal itself is ambiguous -
let us disclose our conclusion in advance. Do we claim each other is ambiguous, 
somewhat as the adjective light means bright (the opposite of dark) and also means 
low in weight (the opposite of heavy) according to a speaker's choice? Or do 
we claim each other has a single meaning that exploits an utterance's context 
in detennining the utterance's truth conditions, somewhat as here unambiguously 
means this place, and refers on each occasion to wherever it is uttered? 
We believe the latter: the reciprocal has just one meaning, a flexible or 
context-sensitive one in virtue of which it makes varying contributions to a state­
ment's truth conditions depending on the context in which it appears. The variation 
is not just in 'fudge factor' or in quantificational force; the reciprocal 's meaning 
is actually capable in appropriate contexts of giving rise to many of the forms of 
truth conditions discussed in the previous sections. What, precisely, is that context­
sensitive meaning then? 
The answer we propose is based on an empirical generalization we have 
discovered. 
(SMH) The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis: 
A reciprocal sentence is interpreted as expressing the logically strongest can­
didate truth conditions which are not contradicted by known properties of 
the relation expressed by the reciprocal scope when restricted to the group 
argument. 
We now examine the evidence supporting this generalization, using the examples 
discussed earlier and the truth conditions we determined that they have. 
In a large collection of the examples we have discussed, the reciprocal means 
Strong Reciprocity. The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis is simple to verify in these 
cases - just check for each reciprocal sentence interpreted as a Strong Reciprocal 
that there are circumstances under which it would be true, given that the reciprocal 
is interpreted that way. As one example, 
(3 1 )  (= 4) Willow School 's fifth-graders know each other. 
is satisfiable when interpreted as expressing SR, given the properties of knowing. 
Thus the SMH predicts that the truth conditions of sentence (3 1 )  are SR, since this 
is the logically strongest candidate for truth conditions of the reciprocal. 
An example of a different sort, meaning not SR but Intermediate Reciprocity, 
is 
(32) Five Boston pitchers sat alongside each other. 
modeled on sentence (6) from The New York Times. Here the reciprocal's scope is 
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the relation of sitting alongside. Note first that sitting alongside is a symmetric re­
lation. As pointed out in Section 6, this renders many of the twelve truth conditions 
discussed earlier equivalent to other ones, collapsing the lattice to only three possi­
bilities: SR(=[2]), the strongest; IR(=[ I ] , [3] ,[4]) ;  and IAO(=SmR,PIR,[5] ,WR), the 
weakest. Another important property of sitting alongside is that its restriction to any 
group of pitchers is 'two-valued' :  a pitcher can sit alongside no more than two other 
pitchers, since pitchers are people and thus have only two sides. When the group 
A consists of more than three members, then, SR cannot hold. Of course, IAO is 
consistent with the properties of sitting alongside; but so is the logically stronger 
IR, so the SMH predicts that IR is the meaning. 
The scope of 
(33) (= 8) Mrs. Smith's third-grade students gave each other measles. 
is the relation of giving measles to. Note that giving measles is necessarily asym­
metric, so that SR, SmR, and [ 1 ] cannot hold. In fact, even [5] cannot hold, since 
interpretation [5] of (33) makes it entail 
(34) Each third grader gave another third grader measles. 
A person can only have measles once; however, if there are finitely many third 
graders, (34) entails the existence of a collection of third graders who passed measles 
around in a circle, which is impossible without one or more of them getting measles 
twice. So interpretation [5] of (33), which entails (34), is necessarily false. This 
leaves Inclusive Alternative Ordering as the interpretation that the SMH predicts for 
(33) if interpretation [4] is necessarily false. 
However [4] merely entails that 
(35) any two third graders are connected by a chain of third graders each of whom 
either gave measles to or got measles from the next one. 
Together with the impossibility of getting measles twice, this entails that there is 
one third grader from whom all the others got measles either directly or indirectly. 
This disease transmission pattern is actually possible; so the Strongest Meaning 
Hypothesis actually predicts that (33) does not mean IAO but something stronger 
such as [4] . 
But we suggested in Subsection 3 . 1  that (33) means IAO. Can we reconcile 
the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis with the observations considered there? The 
answer is yes if we accept that there is some vagueness in the meaning of (33). 
While the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis predicts this sentence means one third 
grader was the only point of entry of measles into the class, we could allow that 
there might be a few more points of entry, but still only a small number, if the class 
is large enough. This is analogous to the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis predicting 
that sentence (9) means Strong Reciprocity, but vagueness allowing some men not 
to hit some other ones when the sentence is true of a bar-room brawL 
Note a further problem for the SMH, which cannot be solved in the same way. 
Interpretation [3] of sentence (33) is also consistent. It entails that measles were 
propagated through the third-grade class in a linear, nonbranching chain. Clearly 
the sentence does not mean this. This is a serious problem if [3] is truly a candidate 
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meaning for the reciprocal. So far, however, we have not found a convincing example 
that attests [3] . We conclude tentatively that [3] is not a candidate interpretation of 
the reciprocal at al1.4 
The SMH correctly predicts that sentence 
(36) Their bunk beds are on top of one another. 
discussed by Kanski ( 1987), means IAO rather than SR even though the group con­
sists of only two members. This successful prediction of the SMH is unfortunately 
accompanied by an incorrect one, however, namely that any reciprocal sentence 
will mean IAO if all stronger candidates are unsatisfiable. For instance, the SMH 
predicts that 
(37) # Those two people are each other's mother. 
is true just in case one of the people is the mother of the other. In fact, contrary to 
the SMH, this sentence means Strong Reciprocity and is necessarily false. These 
examples show the need to revise the SMH in a way that preserves the prediction 
that the reciprocal means the strongest possible candidate but drops the insistence 
that only satisfiable candidates are possible. 
S Alternative proposals for reciprocal meaning: Why they fail 
Varying quantification over individuals? Other researchers have proposed cri­
teria for determining reciprocal meanings which appeal to the context in which the 
reciprocal appears. Roberts ( 1987) proposes that reciprocals have a single meaning, 
but one that is context dependent, so that the reciprocal can make different semantic 
contributions depending on the context in which it appears. Following a suggestion 
of Emrnon Bach's, she proposes to use the context-sensitive quantifier ENOUGH to 
define reciprocal meaning (Roberts, 1987, page 142): 
(38) ENOUGH! x E A. ENOUGH2 y, z E A. x =1= y 1\ x =1= z 1\ R(x, y) 1\ R(z, x) 
Roberts notes that varying the interpretation of ENOUGH yields Strong Reciprocity 
and Weak Reciprocity as subcases: Interpreting both instances of ENOUGH as uni­
versal quantification gives Strong Reciprocity, while interpreting the first instance 
of ENOUGH as universal quantification and the second as existential quantification 
gives Weak Reciprocity. In fact, Roberts' formula (38) does not quite achieve the 
intended effect. To get Strong Reciprocity by interpreting ENOUGH! and ENOUGH2 as 
universal quantifiers, the conditions x =1= y and x =1= z must appear in the restriction 
of the second universal quantifier. This problem can easily be repaired by modifying 
(38) as follows: 
(39) ENOUGH! x(x E A, 
ENOUGH2 y , z (y E A 1\ z E A 1\ x =1= y 1\ x =1= z, R(x, y) 1\ R(z, x) ) )  
Here, ENOUGH! i s  a type ( 1 , 1 )  quantifier, and ENOUGH2 i s  a type (2, 2) quantifier. 
We agree with Roberts that it is necessary to appeal to contextual factors 
to determine the semantic contribution of the reciprocal; however, the particular 
4Note that PIR, which, like [3], involves transitive closure (+) inside another operator, is also 
unattested. It may be that the use of transitive closure in our parameterization scheme should be 
reconsidered. 
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appeal to context that she makes is insufficient to capture the variety of reciprocal 
meanings that are found. For instance, there is no way to vary the interpretation 
of ENOUGH to produce the truth conditions required for Intermediate Reciprocity, 
though, as we have seen, some reciprocal sentences impose these requirements : 
(40) The freeway exits are spaced five miles from each other. 
Intuitively, the difficulty with Roberts 's proposal for reciprocal meanings is that 
it assumes that varying the force of quantification over individuals is sufficient 
to distinguish different reciprocal meanings. Examples such as (40) show that to 
properly distinguish different reciprocal meanings, it is necessary to quantify over 
pairs of individuals standing in the relation R, which comes from the polyadic 
quantifier RECIP. 5 
Unambiguous reciprocal meaning? Langendoen ( 1978), in proposing various 
possible reciprocal meanings, shared a common assumption with a number of 
other researchers studying the semantics of reciprocity: that the reciprocal makes a 
uniform semantic contribution on every occasion of its use. Langendoen' s intention, 
then, was to discover the core of truth conditions included in every instance of use 
of the reciprocal; this common meaning must, he reasoned, constitute the semantic 
contribution of the reciprocal. Thus, if he could find data counterexemplifying a 
proposed reciprocal meaning, then that meaning could be ruled out. His analysis, 
then, rules out all but the weakest meaning he discusses, Weak Reciprocity, as the 
correct meaning of the reciprocal. 
Of course, Langendoen wouldn't deny that examples like (4 1 )  appear to 
express Strong Reciprocity. 
(4 1 )  (= 4) Willow School's fifth-graders know each other. 
An advocate of his position needs to explain why such examples appear to mean 
something stronger than Weak Reciprocity. Doing so will presumably involve 
appeal to pragmatic strengthening of the proposition that according to them is the 
sentence's literal meaning. 
One way such strengthening might occur is through conversational implica­
ture. A hallmark of conversational implicatures is their cancel ability. The added 
5Under reasonable assumptions, one can prove that no choice of ENOUGH! and ENOUGHz makes 
(39) capture the truth conditions ofIntermediate Reciprocity. Since the variables y and z in (39) vary 
independently, (39) must be equivalent to the following formula on models where R is symmetric: 
(i) ENOUGH! x(x E A, ENOUGH3 y(y E A ll x  =/= y, R(x, y ) ) ) ,  
Here, ENOUGH! i s  as before, and ENOUGH3 is a suitable quantifier of type ( I ,  I ) .  Now i t  i s  easy to prove 
that Intermediate Reciprocity (lR) cannot be equivalent to (i) on all models where R is symmetric, 
provided that ENOUGH! and ENOUGH3 are permutation invariant, as all 'logical' quantifiers are (see 
van Benthem 1986 or Westerstihl 1 989). It suffices to observe that while IR distinguishes the 
following two models, (i) cannot: 
(ii) . _ . _  . ...... . _ . ...... . 
� 
(iii) . ...-. . ......... . � . .......... . ......... . � 
(Here, all individuals are in A and arrows indicate that R holds in both directions.) Since (39), but 
not IR, is equivalent to (i) on all symmetric models, (39) and IR cannot be equivalent. 
What Do Reciprocals Mean? 
strength of (4 1 )  over Weak Reciprocity does not, however, seem to be cancelable, 
as evidenced by the inconsistency of (42): 
(42) (= 5) # Willow School's fifth-graders know each other, but the oldest one 
doesn't know the youngest. 
Thus it does not seem that a Gricean approach to strengthening can do justice 
to the facts. Moreover, conversational implicatures are highly ad hoc, their specific 
content varying enormously with changes in the situation of utterance. However, 
the literature on reciprocals suggests that only a few different forms of proposition 
are possible strengthened interpretations of a reciprocal sentence. It is completely 
unclear, at best, how strengthening Weak Reciprocity by conversational implicature 
could function so as always to yield one of this small number of stronger propositions 
as what is implicated. 
9 Formalizing the Strongest Meaning Hypothesis 
The Strongest Meaning Hypothesis is that a reciprocal sentence means the logically 
strongest one of these candidates that is satisfiable. To make this precise, we need a 
set 8R of axioms giving the known properties of each relation R that could be the 
scope of a reciprocal statement, such as symmetry or transitivity. Suppose we have 
an 'oracle' 8 that gives us such a set of axioms for each relation. 
Recall the ten candidate truth conditions we still have under consideration 
for reciprocals - six previously proposed candidates, supplemented with four 
additional ones generated by Westerst3.hl's suggestion for regularizing these. Keep 
in mind the implication lattice of these ten candidate definitions. 
Then we define RECIP( A, R) as follows, where p and q range over these ten 
definitions of RECIP: 
V(q 1\ 1\((8R F (p -+ q) 1\ 8R � (q -+ p) )  -+ 8R F ...,p) )  
q p 
Given a particular oracle 8, RECIP means the disjunction of all the strongest candidate 
meanings q such that q holds, and any strictly stronger meaning p is inconsistent 
with the axioms 8R. Note that: 
RECIP( A, R) <-+ V r 
r and no stronger candidate is consistent with 8 R 
When there is a unique strongest candidate definition which is consistent with the 
logical properties of R, the axioms for R imply that RECIP(A, R) is equivalent to 
that candidate definition. When there are several such candidates, the axioms for R 
imply that RECIP( A, R) is equivalent to the disjunction of those candidates. 
10 Conclusion 
We have tried to make sense of the plethora of apparent meanings that RECIP can 
have, taking into account the apparent lack of ambiguity of RECIP, and to give the 
best possible systematization of previous proposals for reciprocal meaning: the 
strongest meaning that is consistent with known facts is the one that will apply. 
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